Frequently asked questions.

ACDI stands for Automated Cryptographic Discovery and Inventory — the tool category CISA named for software that automatically discovers and inventories cryptography across an environment, replacing manual crypto audits. QuantaView is an ACDI platform: pull-only agents discover every algorithm, key, and certificate across the estate, score quantum risk per asset, and export a live CycloneDX 1.7 CBOM.

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The federal migration calendar, set by EO 14412 and OMB M-26-15 and coordinated through CISA's Post-Quantum Cryptography Initiative, requires agencies to maintain an automated cryptographic inventory now, complete migration to post-quantum key establishment by 2030, and complete migration to post-quantum digital signatures by the end of 2031. EnQuanta publishes a live countdown of every deadline on its Federal-Mandates page.

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A CBOM is a machine-readable inventory of the cryptography in a system — algorithms, keys, certificates, protocols and where each is used — standardized in CycloneDX 1.7. It is to cryptography what an SBOM is to software components. QuantaView generates a live CBOM from continuous discovery rather than a point-in-time audit.

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Harvest-now, decrypt-later is the practice of recording encrypted traffic today so it can be decrypted once a cryptographically relevant quantum computer exists. Any data with long-term sensitivity that crosses a network under classical encryption is already exposed — the risk starts when the data is sent, not when the quantum computer arrives.

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Yes. EnQuanta's cryptography is a FIPS 140-3 validated cryptographic module — CMVP certificate #5312 (Active, software-only; issued June 5, 2026). The NIST PQC algorithms (ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA) are delivered through a CAVP-validated provider, with module-boundary PQC validation in process. Its QRNG entropy comes from Quantinuum's Quantum Origin, whose entropy source is validated under NIST SP 800-90B ESV #E214.

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CNSA 2.0 is the NSA's Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0 — the required algorithm set for National Security Systems, including ML-KEM and ML-DSA. EnQuanta's cryptography is CNSA 2.0 aligned: the validated algorithm set matches the suite's requirements and tracks its timeline.

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Yes. QuantaView deploys fully on-premise, including offline installation for air-gapped enclaves. No data leaves the environment, which is why the platform is validated through U.S. DoW programs and used in classified-adjacent settings.

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No. Remediation in QuantaView is one-click, human-approved, and fully reversible. The platform prepares the exact change, a person approves it, and every change can be rolled back. There is no silent or automatic modification of production cryptography.

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QuantaPass is EnQuanta's Intelligent Access platform: phishing-resistant WebAuthn/FIDO2 passkeys with quantum-sourced challenges, post-quantum protected credential storage, and multi-engine voice, face and video verification designed to reject AI-generated deepfakes. It extends the same cryptographic core from machine identity to user identity.

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QuantaTrust is the biometric assurance core inside QuantaPass: dual-engine voice, face and video verification with passive liveness and a deepfake forensic score on every call. In a published benchmark it rejected 1,000 of 1,000 professional-grade voice clones with zero false rejections of the real speaker, and nothing biometric is ever stored.

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Crypto-agility is the ability to change cryptographic algorithms, key sources and policies by configuration rather than by re-engineering applications. QuantaCrypt delivers it through intent-based policy: responding to a new threat or standard is a managed policy update, not a redeployment — which matters because post-quantum standards will keep evolving.

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Yes. QuantaCrypt ships as an OpenSSL 3.x provider and negotiates its hybrid post-quantum key exchange through standard TLS 1.3 — Chrome, Edge, Brave and Firefox negotiate it natively with zero client changes. Payload protection rides inside an ordinary HTTPS session.

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EnQuanta is a U.S. cryptography company building quantum plus AI resilient security: QuantaView (Cryptographic Intelligence), QuantaPass (Intelligent Access), and the QuantaCrypt crypto-agile core beneath both. The company holds U.S. Patents 12,627,480 and 12,712,724, has 18 patent filings under rare John Doe secrecy orders requested by ONR with NSA, and is registered for U.S. defense work (CAGE 7U3G1). Its operating rhythm is four verbs: Find Fix Defend.

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They validate different things. CAVP, the Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program, tests that one implementation of one algorithm — ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, AES — computes the right answers. CMVP, the Cryptographic Module Validation Program, validates the whole module against FIPS 140-3: its boundary, roles, self-tests, key management and the algorithms inside it, and issues a numbered certificate. A CAVP result on its own is not FIPS 140-3 validation. EnQuanta's module holds CMVP certificate #5312 (Active, software-only, issued 2026-06-05); its NIST PQC algorithms are delivered through a CAVP-validated provider, with module-boundary PQC validation in process. Both records are public on csrc.nist.gov.

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Ask for the CMVP certificate number and look it up on the NIST CMVP validated-modules list at csrc.nist.gov. The entry shows the module name, the validation level, its status (Active, Historical or Revoked), whether it is software or hardware, and the algorithm list. Then ask which NIST PQC algorithms — FIPS 203 ML-KEM, FIPS 204 ML-DSA, FIPS 205 SLH-DSA — are covered by the module's own validation today and which are delivered through a CAVP-validated provider; a credible vendor states this plainly. EnQuanta's answer: CMVP certificate #5312, Active, software-only; the PQC algorithms are delivered through a CAVP-validated provider, and module-boundary PQC validation is in process.

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NIST finalized three post-quantum standards in August 2024: FIPS 203 (ML-KEM, key establishment), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA, digital signatures) and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA, stateless hash-based signatures). For National Security Systems, NSA's CNSA 2.0 selects ML-KEM-1024 and ML-DSA-87, with LMS and XMSS for firmware signing, alongside AES-256 and SHA-384/512. OMB M-26-15 requires agencies to use PQC key establishment by 2030-12-31 and PQC signatures by the end of 2031. EnQuanta delivers ML-KEM, ML-DSA and SLH-DSA through a CAVP-validated provider alongside its FIPS 140-3 validated module (CMVP #5312), with module-boundary PQC validation in process, and is CNSA 2.0 aligned.

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Yes. EnQuanta's QuantaCrypt cryptographic module is FIPS 140-3 validated as a software-only module — CMVP certificate #5312, status Active, issued 2026-06-05 — and delivers the NIST PQC algorithms (ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA) through a CAVP-validated provider, with module-boundary PQC validation in process. Because it is software, it ships as an OpenSSL 3.x provider and runs on-premise and in air-gapped enclaves without dedicated hardware. The certificate can be checked on the NIST CMVP list at csrc.nist.gov.

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Both, in one platform. Pull-only endpoint agents inventory keys, certificates, libraries and algorithm use on each host and make no inbound connections, so they are safe for legacy, disconnected and intermittently connected systems. A passive TLS observer records handshakes on the wire without generating traffic, and active scanning covers what agents cannot reach. Every finding is normalized into one continuously refreshed Cryptography Bill of Materials with CycloneDX 1.7 export. The whole platform deploys on-premise, including air-gapped enclaves.

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A point-in-time inventory is a report: accurate the day it is produced and stale as soon as a certificate rotates, a library updates or a new service ships. A live CBOM is a continuously refreshed record. QuantaView's agents and network observers keep the Cryptography Bill of Materials converging on the current state of the estate, so quantum-risk scores, compliance posture and migration progress are measured rather than estimated. The live CBOM exports in CycloneDX 1.7 so it can feed OMB inventory reporting and downstream tooling.

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It means the cryptography an application uses is decided by policy rather than by code. Instead of hard-coding a cipher suite or key size into each service, you declare intent — for example hybrid post-quantum key establishment with an AES-256 floor, CNSA 2.0 aligned — and the QuantaCrypt provider enforces it at runtime through OpenSSL 3.x. Rotating an algorithm, adding a PQC hybrid or retiring a weak suite becomes a configuration change rather than a redeploy, which is what OMB M-26-15 asks for when it requires crypto-agility at every phase of the migration.

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A key is only as unpredictable as the randomness behind it, and post-quantum keys are no exception. EnQuanta sources quantum random numbers from Quantinuum's Quantum Origin, whose entropy source is validated under NIST SP 800-90B (ESV #E214 — Quantinuum's validation of its entropy source). That quantum entropy feeds the QuantaCrypt core and the quantum-sourced authentication challenges in QuantaPass, so hybrid post-quantum and classical keys alike start from measured, validated randomness rather than from a software pseudo-random generator alone.

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Cryptographic discovery tools generally take one of four approaches: static code analysis, which finds cryptography in source and binaries but not what is actually running; agent-based host scanning, which sees live keys, certificates and library use on each machine; passive network observation, which sees the algorithms actually negotiated on the wire; and multi-modal platforms that combine several of these. QuantaView combines pull-only host agents, a passive TLS observer and active scanning in a single on-premise platform, adds quantum-risk scoring and continuous compliance scoring against 39 frameworks, and exports one live CycloneDX 1.7 CBOM. Remediation stays one-click, human-approved and fully reversible.

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Yes. QuantaCrypt SDK exposes the same crypto-agile core that ships as the OpenSSL 3.x provider, with documented APIs for QuantaStack (hybrid post-quantum key establishment), QuantaMesh (TLS 1.3 transport) and QuantaPack (incryption), plus a setup guide; it is available for Go today. The same framework is packaged as QuantaCrypt Storage, incrypted fault-tolerant storage, and QuantaCrypt Vault, anti-tamper protection for firmware and embedded assets.

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Yes. QuantaView and QuantaCrypt deploy fully on-premise, including offline installation for air-gapped enclaves, and the endpoint agents are pull-only with no inbound connections, so they fit disconnected, intermittent and limited-bandwidth (DIL) and tactical environments. EnQuanta holds DD2345 #0087060, has personnel cleared to Secret and TS/SCI, is registered as CAGE 7U3G1 and UEI ELNHMD2474D5, and its work has been validated through U.S. DoW programs. The cryptography is a FIPS 140-3 validated module (CMVP #5312) and CNSA 2.0 aligned.

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Inventory first. M-26-15 gives agencies 120 days to produce a migration plan and sets PQC key establishment by 2030-12-31 and PQC signatures by the end of 2031, with crypto-agility required at every phase. The plan is only as good as the inventory beneath it, so the fastest start is an automated cryptographic discovery and inventory (ACDI) pass that produces a CBOM you can prioritize from: which systems carry long-lived sensitive data exposed to harvest-now-decrypt-later, which certificates and keys expire soonest, and where legacy algorithms are still being negotiated. QuantaView runs that pass on-premise and keeps the CBOM live so progress is measured against the 2030 and 2031 dates. Find Fix Defend.

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Yes. "A Scenario-Based Evaluation of CRQC+AI Vulnerability Spectrum for TLS 1.3 Cryptographic Dependencies" (Grover, Haile, Pedersen, Uner and Erickson, 2026) is a public preprint on arXiv, identifier 2608.23785 in Cryptography and Security, released under a CC BY 4.0 license. It evaluates quantum and AI-accelerated risk to the cryptographic dependencies of TLS 1.3 under an evidence-tiered model that separates mechanism-backed threats, such as Shor's algorithm against RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography, from contingency-backed risks to lattice-based post-quantum cryptography. The analysis behind QuantaCrypt's dynamic-hybrid, crypto-agile design and behind QuantaView's quantum-risk scoring draws on the same threat model. Read it at https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.23785.

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The attacker gets ciphertext they cannot use. Credential material is sealed per record through QuantaCrypt incryption, so there is no shared database key that could be exfiltrated once and used to decrypt everything, and every stored credential is post-quantum protected against harvest-now, decrypt-later attacks. Tenant isolation is enforced at the cipher level, so ciphertext belonging to one tenant is mathematically un-decryptable in another tenant's context. Successful passkey verification also binds the session to the enrolled user and releases an out-of-band QuantaSecret pre-shared key into that session's key derivation, so incrypted records are cryptographically bound to an authenticated identity rather than only to a channel.

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No. In QuantaPass's High-Assurance Mode, privileged actions such as wire transfers, PHI access and admin logins are gated by QuantaTrust's multi-engine voice, face and video verification. Every video verification runs four gates an impostor must beat simultaneously — face match, passive face liveness and both voice engines — plus a dedicated deepfake forensic score. Biometric enrollment is never offered at login, so a stolen passkey cannot be used to enroll an attacker's biometrics. Every error path in registration, login and biometric verification denies by default.

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Through a TypeScript SDK that wraps the WebAuthn browser ceremony — Safari autofill, Firefox quirks and Android transports handled — plus session JWTs your backend verifies offline via JWKS. QuantaPass runs full relying-party ceremonies for platform authenticators such as Touch ID, Face ID and Windows Hello and for roaming FIDO2 security keys, and credentials are bound to the registered domain, which neutralizes look-alike phishing domains outright. Biometric onboarding is three short enrollments and a verify call, available in 119 languages. It deploys in the cloud or fully self-hosted and air-gapped, with no third-party biometric service in the loop.

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Isolation is enforced at four independent layers, down to the cipher: ciphertext belonging to one tenant is mathematically un-decryptable in another tenant's context, because credential material is sealed per record through QuantaCrypt incryption with no shared database key. A breach of one tenant's records therefore exposes nothing from another's, and one-to-many identification, when you need to know who and not just whether, is scoped to a user group and denies by default on any error.

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Every registration and authentication challenge in QuantaPass is sourced from the QuantaCrypt QRNG, whose entropy comes from Quantinuum's Quantum Origin (validated under NIST SP 800-90B, ESV #E214 — Quantinuum's validation), rather than from an operating-system pseudo-random generator. Fail-closed means the ceremony never quietly falls back to weaker randomness: silent degradation is forbidden. The same rule runs through QuantaPass and QuantaTrust, where any error, non-success response or sub-threshold confidence denies by default.

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No. Raw voice and face data is processed in memory and permanently discarded the moment the call completes; only confidence scores persist. Every verification also returns a liveness score that can be enforced per endpoint, and any error, non-success response or sub-threshold confidence fails closed. QuantaTrust runs in the cloud or fully self-hosted and air-gapped, with no third-party biometric service in the loop, so biometric processing stays inside your own boundary.

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Detect-only tools tell you that something is fake. QuantaTrust tells you who someone is and rejects the synthetic impostor in the same call: it is authentication, not just detection. A dual-engine voice architecture pairs a physiological vocal-tract model with neural speaker embeddings, and verification passes only when both agree, alongside passive single-frame liveness and a deepfake forensic score on every call. Passive liveness needs no blinks, head turns or challenges, so it adds zero seconds to sign-in, and the detector is retrained continuously against new deepfake generators.

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In a published experiment, 1,000 of 1,000 professional-grade voice clones were rejected. Each clone was built with a leading commercial cloning platform, trained on more than 30 minutes of the real speaker and saying the genuine verification phrase; the best deepfake fell 0.14 points short of the threshold, the average landed about 30 points below the real voice, and the real speaker passed. For face and video, a study of 1,840 images, half real and half synthetic, across five attack families plus full deepfake video produced a pooled ROC-AUC of 0.946, measured ISO/IEC 30107-3-style on the live production endpoint. On video, scoring multiple frames and keeping the most suspicious one roughly doubles the operational catch rate.

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Every asset receives an aggregate crypto-risk score out of 100 that combines harvest-now, decrypt-later exposure, weak keys and expiring certificates, with measured mean time to remediate, so remediation can be prioritized rather than guessed. Findings are classified against FIPS 203, 204 and 205, NIST SP 800-131A and CNSA 2.0 from a 127-algorithm catalog, and posture is scored live against 39 compliance frameworks, including CNSA 2.0, NIST SP 800-171 and 800-53, FIPS 140-3, CMMC 2.0 Level 2, PCI DSS 4.0 and ISO 27001. Because the CBOM is continuously refreshed, the score moves as the estate changes rather than at the next audit.

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The paper uses an evidence-tiered model with three tiers: mechanism-backed threats, where a known algorithm breaks the primitive, as Shor's algorithm does for RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography; contingency-backed risks to lattice-based post-quantum cryptography such as ML-KEM, which apply only if an unproven structural weakness materializes; and hypothesis-only risks to hash-based and symmetric primitives such as SLH-DSA and AES-256, where no structural attack is known. It identifies no known break of ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA or AES-256. Under its scenarios, RSA risk crosses the 50 percent threshold between 2030 and 2032, while PQC risk becomes non-zero only after 2032 to 2035, and only under contingency scenarios conditional on an unproven dimension collapse. The authors conclude that PQC migration is mandatory on the 2030 and 2031 federal deadlines and by harvest-now, decrypt-later reasoning, and that crypto-agility and hybrid deployment are necessary complements to any migration. Full text: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.23785.

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Yes. Every CycloneDX 1.7 CBOM export can be requested as a signed bundle: the exact CBOM bytes plus a detached FIPS 204 ML-DSA-65 signature and the signer certificate, verifiable with stock OpenSSL. The signer certificate chains to the tenant's ML-DSA-87 root, whose identity anchor EnQuanta publishes at enquanta.com/.well-known/quantaview-cbom-root.json and in DNS, so a recipient can check both the signature and the root's identity without trusting the sender. The document states its own revision in-document, using the tenant's monotonic export sequence as the BOM version, and carries per-component evidence blocks that record the discovery technique and confidence behind each finding. Post-quantum signing is on by default.

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Yes. Against the 2026 Minimum Elements for a Software Bill of Materials (CISA and 17 co-authoring agencies, version 2.1, published July 29, 2026), QuantaView meets all 17 minimum data fields and all six practice-and-process elements, verified element by element against the shipping backend. Fifteen fields are met outright; the component hash pair is met for certificates and observed public keys, refused by design for private-key material, and structurally inapplicable for sessions and abstract algorithm entries, with each state declared explicitly rather than left blank. The two elements CISA added in 2026, the Author Signature and explicit unknown-versus-withheld states, are covered: exports carry a detached post-quantum ML-DSA-65 signature by default, and the generation context is stated in the document itself as a continuous operations state re-derived every discovery cycle. QuantaView produces two BOM families: the cryptographic CBOM and per-binary software SBOMs generated by the endpoint agent.

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All four the strategy names, plus several it does not. CISA's Strategy for Migrating to Automated PQC Discovery and Inventory Tools defines the ACDI discovery types as network, file system, database and software package, covering data in transit and at rest. QuantaView ships all four and adds PKI and key stores, Kubernetes and service mesh, certificate transparency logs, and native operational-technology control protocols such as DNP3 and OPC UA. Every finding carries the discovery technique that produced it and a confidence grade, so an assessor can see how each fact was obtained rather than take the inventory on trust.

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OMB M-23-02 defines nine data items an agency must report for every quantum-vulnerable cryptographic system, and CISA's ACDI strategy states that only three of the nine can be collected by ACDI or CDM tooling today. QuantaView automates items 4 through 6 in full — the algorithm, the cryptographic service provided and the key length, observed on the wire and at rest and graded against a 127-algorithm catalog; software-package provenance; and the operating system with major and minor version — and partially automates items 7 and 8, hosting and data lifecycle. Cloud key-store and Kubernetes connectors know their provider and agents know they are on-premises, but a complete hosting answer still needs agency confirmation, so QuantaView claims partial rather than full. The remaining items — the FISMA system identifier, the FIPS 199 categorization and the HVA identifier — are administrative and stay manual by design.

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Yes. Under EO 14306, CISA maintains product categories in which PQC-capable products are widely available and directs organizations to acquire only PQC-capable products in those categories, with the list updated regularly. QuantaView reports, per asset, whether post-quantum or classical algorithms are actually being negotiated, so an agency can verify PQC capability in fielded products by observation rather than rely on a vendor's version number. The same per-asset posture feeds the live CBOM, so procurement evidence and the cryptographic inventory come from one continuously refreshed record.

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Yes. QuantaView consumes CycloneDX SBOMs from the usual SBOM tooling, including a push endpoint for CI pipelines, and folds the crypto-relevant components into the CBOM instead of maintaining a parallel document. For air-gapped enclaves that path runs SBOM-only and fully offline by default, with no vulnerability-database fetches. QuantaView also produces two BOM families of its own: the cryptographic CBOM and per-binary software SBOMs that the endpoint agent generates from serving binaries, which are swept for CVEs fleet-wide.

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QuantaStack is QuantaCrypt's dynamic-hybrid key-establishment layer. It combines a NIST-approved post-quantum KEM anchor with additional standardized KEMs — HQC and X25519 in the open-standards realm — so a session never rests on a single algorithm or hardness assumption; the shared secrets are combined into one hybrid shared secret through a KMAC256-based key-derivation function that follows NIST SP 800-56C. Exposed through the QuantaMesh OpenSSL module as a TLS 1.3 group and cipher suite, the client sends the KEM encapsulation key in the key_share extension and the server returns the KEM ciphertext in its own key_share, so the handshake completes in one round trip when the server supports the group; on the standard hybrid path QuantaCrypt prefers X25519MLKEM768. The resulting forward-secure session keys feed QuantaPack, which protects the application data records.

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Two defense-in-depth layers for data in transit. The optional double ratchet adds per-packet forward secrecy and per-packet replay rejection at the QuantaPack record level, for deployments such as real-time tactical communications and streaming voice and video; each record carries its own ratchet counter and is protected with its own ratcheted key. The QuantaSecret pre-shared key is a mandatory component of the construction: a QRNG-generated key with at least 256 bits of min-entropy and at least 5,000 bytes in length, resident in non-volatile memory at the endpoints, rotated on a configurable interval, established out of band and never transmitted on the data channel. It contributes defense-in-depth entropy to key derivation, so an attacker who captures the handshake on the wire still lacks the material to derive the session keys.

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NIST CSWP 48 (initial public draft, September 18, 2025) describes the nine logical architecture components of the NCCoE Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography project, with their CSF 2.0 subcategories and SP 800-53 Rev. 5 controls. Mapped component by component, EnQuanta covers all four Discovery and Inventory components in full through QuantaView — cryptographic data collection, cryptographic inventory, cryptographic analytics, and certificate discovery and management — and four of the five PQC Implementation components in full or in part: quantum-ready algorithm implementations and cryptographic service implementations through QuantaCrypt, quantum-ready integration tools and plugins, and quantum-ready certificate authority implementations through the per-tenant ML-DSA-87 root that signs every CBOM export. The fifth, quantum-ready hardware security modules, does not apply to a software-only vendor beyond integration. EnQuanta is not yet an NCCoE project collaborator.

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Not yet. Read in full, the thirteen FISMA documents CISA publishes, including the FY2026 CIO metrics, contain no post-quantum metric; the word quantum does not appear. The few cryptography metrics FISMA carries today, such as systems that only establish non-opportunistic encrypted connections, are self-reported integers, and they are the base population any PQC key-establishment metric will need. EnQuanta's proposal is a set of eight PQC FISMA metrics written in the FY2026 CIO instrument's own denominator structure and aligned to the M-26-15 migration phases, each computable by any conforming ACDI tool: quantum-vulnerable key establishment by impact level; classical-only signatures and certificates by impact level; long-lived sensitive data over quantum-vulnerable transit, the harvest-now, decrypt-later exposure; the share of systems whose algorithms change by configuration rather than code release, which is cryptographic agility; inventory coverage against an independent estate denominator; M-23-02 items 4 through 6 populated by automated tooling versus manual entry; OT systems with plaintext or authentication-only control-protocol traffic; and whether a signed, independently verifiable cryptographic inventory was submitted. All eight are computable from data QuantaView already holds, replacing self-report with observation.

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Every component in the CBOM export carries its own evidence: the discovery technique that produced it, expressed with the CycloneDX evidence enumeration, and a confidence weight reflecting how the fact was actually obtained, plus BOM-level citations that attribute evidence to the tool. Unknowns are explicit rather than blank. QuantaView uses a three-state model: unknown-to-author for a value it could not learn, structural omission for fields that do not apply, and withheld-by-author, reserved for policy-suppressed values. Component hashes follow the same discipline: SHA-256 over the DER for certificates and observed public keys, refused by design for private-key material, and marked inapplicable for sessions and abstract algorithm entries.

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Two granted U.S. patents, both assigned to VoiceIt Technologies, Inc. dba EnQuanta and both public at the USPTO. U.S. Patent 12,627,480 B1, "Systems for Quantum Cyber Resilience of Digital Assets in Transit," issued May 12, 2026 (https://image-ppubs.uspto.gov/dirsearch-public/print/downloadPdf/12627480). U.S. Patent 12,712,724 B1, "Systems for Obfuscation and Manipulation of Strings for Digital Asset Protection," issued August 18, 2026 (https://image-ppubs.uspto.gov/dirsearch-public/print/downloadPdf/12712724). Beyond these, EnQuanta has more than 50 filings, a published PCT application with a positive patentability search report, and 18 applications that the U.S. Patent Office placed under "John Doe" secrecy orders in October 2024 at the request of the Office of Naval Research with the NSA, the only such orders issued to a private filer in fiscal 2025.

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Yes. EnQuanta hosts a 45-minute online session, "Watch intelligence become action. Live.", on Thursday, October 1, 2026 at 12:00 p.m. Eastern. It walks through discovery of cryptographic assets, review of a finding, an approved change and its rollback in a lab environment, then questions. Register at enquanta.com/live-sessions (native registration through Zoom, or the direct Zoom registration link for webinar 87100177037). Registration through Zoom shares your name and email with EnQuanta and Zoom to manage the webinar.

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Apply to the QuantaDefense Network at enquanta.com/partners. The program covers integrators and VARs, distributors, technology partners and OEMs, and PKI and identity platforms. The application asks for your company, the markets you sell into (federal and defense, banking and payments, energy and utilities, regulated enterprise), your regions, what you sell today and where QuantaView or the QuantaCrypt core would fit. Applications are stored on EnQuanta's own infrastructure and reviewed by the partner team, who reply from info@enquanta.com.

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Use enquanta.com/contact. The form asks what you need (a demo, evaluation, briefing or technical evidence), your organization type (enterprise, government, partner or other) and the platform or product of interest: QuantaView, QuantaPass, QuantaCrypt SDK, Storage or Vault, QuantaTrust, or QuantaCrypt as a whole. Requests are stored on EnQuanta infrastructure, qualified by a private model that never leaves the estate, and answered by the team from info@enquanta.com. A one-page capability statement for contracting officers is at enquanta.com/documents/EnQuanta-Capability-Statement.pdf.

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